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Eighth Amendment Values 
William W. Berry III* & Meghan J. Ryan** 
As with many constitutional provisions, the language of the Eighth Amendment is 
open-ended and vague in its proscription of excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and 
unusual punishments. Because the language of the Constitution does not provide any 
additional descriptive information concerning what might make bail or fines excessive, or 
punishments cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond the text itself to ascertain the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. With respect to the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments, the U.S. Supreme Court has, over the course of several decades, articulated 
a number of relevant underlying values that offer some guidance in interpreting this Eighth 
Amendment provision. These values are also helpful in assessing the excessiveness of bail 
and fines.1 
This Chapter explores several of these core Eighth Amendment values, providing 
an overview of their origin and indicating how such values might apply in interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment in the future. Specifically, this Chapter discusses the principles of 
dignity, individualized sentencing, proportionality—both absolute and comparative, 
humanness, non-arbitrariness, and differentness. The Court has explicitly or implicitly 
invoked each of these values in its Eighth Amendment cases and detailed the scope and 
importance of these values to varying degrees. For the most part, though, the Court has 
remained opaque about how much each of these values influences, and should influence, 
its Eighth Amendment decisions.   
While the scope and reach of the various Eighth Amendment values remain 
uncertain, the Court has made it clear that the meaning of the Amendment—e.g., which 
punishments are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual—changes over time.2 In Weems v. 
United States, the Court explained that, for “a principle[] to be vital, [it] must be capable 
of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth” and that “[t]his is peculiarly true 
of constitutions.” 3  As such, the Court emphasized that the Eighth Amendment is 
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1 See chapters 10 and 11.
2 Cf.  Meghan J. Ryan, The Missing Jury: The Neglected Role of Juries in Eighth 
Amendment Punishments Clause Determinations, 64 FLA. L. REV. 549, 566 (2012)
(explaining that the Court’s Punishments Clause analysis  is “atypical in that [it is] more 
securely tethered to a particular method of constitutional interpretation”: “[b]y focusing 
on . . . “evolving standards” . . . , the Court’s primary standard[] for constitutionality in 
th[is] context[] seem[s] to be tied to a notion of living constitutionalism rather than rooted 
in history as many originalists would prefer”).
3 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
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progressive and may acquire broader meaning over time. 4  The Court cemented this 
principle in its 1958 landmark opinion of Trop v. Dulles,5 indicating that “the words of the 
[Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static.” Accordingly, when 
determining whether a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, courts must 
interpret the prohibition in light of “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”6  
To capture these changing values, the Court has adopted a two-part test to assess 
whether a particular punishment violates the evolving standards of decency, at least in 
capital cases. The first step, an objective inquiry, generally consists of state-counting—
surveying primarily legislatures’ determinations, as well as decisions by sentencing juries, 
about whether the particular jurisdiction has rejected the punishment at issue, at least in the 
relevant circumstances. 7  In the second step, the Court “brings its own independent 
judgment to bear”8 in assessing whether a punishment has become unconstitutionally cruel 
and unusual in light of the purposes of punishment.9   
Viewing the Eighth Amendment’s meaning as evolving over time reflects the 
changing nature of punishments over the course of generations and also the changing views 
and values of Americans and even other citizens of the world. The various Eighth 
Amendment values should be understood in light of this gradual movement toward greater 
enlightenment. 
Dignity 
An important Eighth Amendment value woven into the Eighth Amendment case 
law is that of dignity. In fact, the Court has been more explicit about this Eighth 
Amendment value than others. In 1958, the Court first articulated the requirement that 
punishments respect human dignity in its case of Trop v. Dulles.10 There, a plurality of the 
Court explained: 
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than 
the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment 
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized 
standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed 
depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the 
4 Id. 
5 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
6 Id. 
7 See Meghan J. Ryan, Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment Death Penalty 
Context?, 85 N.C. L. REV. 847, 855 (2007). For a discussion concerning filling the 
content of a counter-majoritarian constitutional provision with a majoritarian assessment, 
see Ch. 6. 
8 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
9 See Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 90–95 (2010).  
10 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
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bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.11 
This focus on dignity has been a touchstone for the Court in its Eighth Amendment cases. 
In case after case, the Court has stated that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”12 
Despite the Court’s emphasis that dignity is the backdrop of the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court has never clearly explained what dignity means in this context. As 
a philosophical concept, and even as a legal one, dignity has a complicated history. 
Although the concept “has been around since antiquity,” dignity really blossomed in the 
aftermath of World War II.13 Reacting to Nazi atrocities, various nations established the 
United Nations (UN), the UN adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
countries around the world have created constitutions protective of human dignity. Yet, at 
both the international and national levels, there has been disagreement—among various 
nations, among various Supreme Court Justices, and even among commentators—about 
what dignity actually means and how it should apply to particular situations. 
Although the Court has neglected to explicitly define Eighth Amendment dignity, 
and although there are various conceptions of dignity among legislators, courts, scholars, 
and commentators, there seems to be at least a common kernel of dignity that persists in 
the Eighth Amendment case law. Some thinkers have more robust notions of dignity, but, 
at the heart of the concept is a respect for individuals as individuals. As Emmanuel Kant 
put it, “a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being . . . but must 
also be used at the same time as an end.”14 Examining the many Eighth Amendment cases 
in which the Court explicitly invoked the concept of dignity, one sees a focus on 
individualism—viewing individuals as ends rather than merely as means. 
Preserving this minimum non-instrumentalization core of dignity has at least two 
facets—imposing only proportionate punishments on criminal offenders and treating 
offenders as human beings.15 For example, in the famous case of Gregg v. Georgia,16 a 
plurality of the Court suggested that respecting dignity prohibits excessive punishments. 
And in Brown v. Plata,17 the Court explained that, “[a]s a consequence of their own actions, 
prisoners may be deprived of rights that are fundamental to liberty” but that “the law and 
the Constitution demand [that] . . . [p]risoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent 
11 Id. at 100. 
12 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–
01); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (same). 
13 Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth 
Amendment, 2016 ILL. L. REV. 2129, 2135–36 (2016); see also Christopher McCrudden, 
Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 
662–64 (2008). 
14 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 209 (Mary J. Gregor trans. & ed., 
Cambridge University Press 1996) (1797). 
15 See Ryan, supra note 13.  
16 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
17 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
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in all persons.” In fact, in examining all of the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases—the 
procedural, type-of-offense, class-of-offender, method-of-punishment, and prison-
condition cases—it seems that the Court has been consistent in adopting an individualism-
directed notion of dignity, which incorporates both proportionality and humanness 
principles.18 
To be sure, this basic conception of Eighth Amendment dignity is still vague and, 
in many ways, cannot unambiguously police the constitutionality of punishments under the 
Amendment. At the same time, many commentators would argue that this conception of 
dignity is too narrow and does not go far enough in proscribing suspect methods, durations, 
and conditions of many punishments. While the Court seems to be cutting back on the 
breadth of Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments,19 this 
non-instrumentalization core of dignity does not necessarily define the outer bounds of 
what this backdrop of the Eighth Amendment proscribes. Rather, it is the kernel of 
protection that the Court has consistently determined is essential to guarding against 
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishments.20 
Taken seriously, this minimum non-instrumentalization core of dignity would limit 
punishment in significant ways—ways not necessarily yet captured in court opinions. 
Staying true to this conception of dignity would mean that purely utilitarian punishment is 
unconstitutional.21 Punishments may certainly be partially instrumentalist, such as under 
the popular theory of limiting retributivism, where retribution sets the outer boundaries of 
punishment and instrumentalist approaches like deterrence determine the exact punishment 
within those endpoints. But punishments that treat individuals as means rather than ends in 
themselves would be impermissible. This suggests that punishing innocent persons is 
unconstitutional.22 While this may not seem shocking, there are numerous court opinions 
suggesting that, if a convicted offender is later found innocent, he has no constitutional 
right to avoid punishment if he received a fair trial, because federal habeas courts review 
for constitutional violations rather than factual errors.23 
The minimum non-instrumentalization core of dignity, and thus of the Eighth 
Amendment, also suggests that mandatorily imposed punishments are constitutionally 
18 See Ryan, supra note 13, at 2156–65. 
19 See, e.g., Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) (rejecting the petitioner’s Eighth 
Amendment challenge because he failed to sufficiently establish that he had identified a 
feasible alternative execution method that would “significantly reduce a substantial risk 
of severe pain”). But see Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (incorporating—
finally—the Excessive Fines Clause such that it applies to the states). Note that recent 
changes to the Supreme Court—the appointment of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh and 
the retirement of Justice Kennedy—will likely have a limiting impact on the breadth of 
Eighth Amendment protections in future years. 
20 See Ryan, supra note 13, at 2156–65. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. at 2168–73. 
23 See id. 
5 
impermissible.24 The Supreme Court has already struck down the mandatory imposition of 
capital punishment and the mandatory imposition of life without the possibility of parole 
(LWOP) for juvenile offenders,25 but mandatory sentences are very common in other areas, 
and taking the Eighth Amendment dignity requirement seriously would mean finding these 
practices unconstitutional. 
Individualized Sentencing 
The Court’s focus on individualism logically translates to the more specific value 
of individualized sentencing. Under the Court’s decisions, individualized sentencing 
means that the sentencing court, at least in capital cases, must examine the individual 
characteristics of the offender and the offense prior to making a sentencing determination. 
This idea germinates from the Court’s decision in McGautha v. California,26 in 
which the Court rejected Fourteenth Amendment due process challenges to the capital jury 
sentencing procedures of California and Ohio. In that case, the Court discussed the 
troubling consequences of jury nullification in response to mandatory death statutes. 
Without the ability to decide whether death was an appropriate sentence for the individual 
offender in question, juries often chose to find the offender not guilty instead of entering a 
guilty verdict that mandated death. In reaffirming the importance of juror sentencing 
discretion in capital cases, even when unguided, the Court explained that juries are critical 
to “maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system.”27 
The Court constitutionalized this idea in Woodson v. North Carolina,28 holding that 
the Eighth Amendment bars mandatory death sentences. Specifically, the Court held that 
the Eighth Amendment requires “the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the 
character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a 
sentence of death.”29  
The Court reaffirmed this value of individualized sentencing determinations in 
Lockett v. Ohio, 30 where it struck down an Ohio statute that limited the mitigating evidence 
available to capital defendants at sentencing to enumerated statutory factors. A plurality of 
the Court made clear that the sentencing judge or jury must consider “as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
24 See id. at 2177–78. 
25 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (striking down the mandatory imposition 
of life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
26 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
27 Id. 
28 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Court applied the same rule in another 
case decided the same day, Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), in which it struck 
down Louisiana’s mandatory death statute. 
29 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303. 
30 438 U.S. 586 (1976). 
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offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”31 
While the Court has primarily focused on this concept of individualized sentencing 
in capital cases, the Court expanded the concept to juvenile life-without-parole (JLWOP) 
sentences in Miller v. Alabama,32 finding that mandatory JLWOP sentences violate the 
Eighth Amendment. In that case, the Court relied on the same individualized sentencing 
concept, emphasizing the unique nature of cases and the need to consider the particularized 
circumstances and conduct of the offender in determining whether a death-in-prison 
sentence is appropriate. 
While LWOP sentences are still permissible for adult offenders, a logical expansion 
of the individualized sentencing concept would be to prohibit mandatory LWOP sentences 
even for adults.33 This extension would result from the Court acknowledging that these 
death-in-prison sentences share many similarities with death sentences, something the 
Court has already done in Miller. A further expansion, though perhaps less likely, would 
be to ban all mandatory sentences.34 
Absolute Proportionality 
In debating the bounds of the Eighth Amendment proscription on cruel and unusual 
punishments, various U.S. Supreme Court Justices have considered whether the Clause 
prohibits only certain torturous methods of punishment, or, alternatively, whether the 
Clause offers broader protection to criminal offenders. Several Justices would require, and 
indeed several cases indicate, that such broader protection demands that imposed sentences 
are proportionate to the crimes committed, accounting for both the characteristics of the 
particular offender and the details of the offense. Although Justices Scalia, Thomas, and  
Rehnquist have famously argued that proportionality has no place in the application of the 
Eighth Amendment,35 a majority of the Court has embraced the value of proportionality.36 
Beginning with the Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia,37 the Supreme Court has 
used the concept of proportionality to hold that, in certain types of cases, death sentences 
constitute cruel and unusual punishments. To date, the Supreme Court has proscribed the 
31 Id. at 604 (opinion of Burger, J.). 
32 567 U.S. 460 (2012).  
33 See William W. Berry III, More Different than Life, Less Different than Death, 71 OHIO
ST. L. J. 1109 (2010) (arguing for expansion of Miller to adult life without parole). 
34 See William W. Berry III, Individualized Executions, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1779 
(2019) (arguing for an application of individualized sentencing to methods of execution); 
William W. Berry III, Individualized Sentencing, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 13 (2019) 
(arguing for an expansion of individualized sentencing to all felony offenses). 
35 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
36 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
37 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
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death penalty for rape, 38  child rape, 39  certain felony murders, 40  juvenile offenders, 41 
“insane” persons,42 and intellectually disabled offenders.43 The concept of proportionality 
embedded in these decisions—“absolute” proportionality—relates to the excessiveness of 
the death penalty in light of the underlying crime or the characteristics of the offender.  
The Court’s analysis in these capital cases begins with the objective assessment of 
jurisdictions’ legislation and jury sentences to determine whether society has generally 
condemned the punishment.44 The second prong of the analysis considers the question of 
whether one or both of the relevant purposes of punishment—retribution and deterrence—
justify the imposition of death.45 The idea championed by the Court is that, when capital 
punishment does not achieve the purpose of retribution or deterrence, that punishment is 
disproportionate and thus violates the Eighth Amendment. For example, in Atkins v. 
Virginia, the Court expressed concern that certain types of defendants, such as those with 
intellectual disabilities, are at a special risk of wrongful execution.46 
In non-capital cases, the Court has fashioned the concept of proportionality in a 
different manner, electing not to apply its more robust test used in capital cases and instead 
using a narrow gross disproportionality standard. Ordinarily, the Court has held that non-
capital sentences are generally proportionate punishments regardless of the offenses at 
issue. This deferential standard has, in essence, created two tracks of Eighth Amendment 
application.47  
In more recent years, though, the Court has carved out a significant exception to 
applying the narrow gross disproportionality standard in non-capital cases: JLWOP 
sentences. In these cases, the Court has used the same two-part test it uses in capital cases 
instead of the gross proportionality test. In Graham v. Florida,48 for example, the Court 
38 Id. 
39 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
40 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
41 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
42 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
43 Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
44 One of us has argued that proportionality extends beyond just deserts retribution
conceptions of proportionality. See William W. Berry III, Separating Retribution from
Proportionality, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 61 (2011); see also Ch. 7.
45 The other two purposes of punishment—incapacitation and rehabilitation—have
generally not been part of the Court’s analysis. Incapacitation seems inappropriate, see
William W. Berry III, Ending Death by Dangerousness, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889 (2010), but
rehabilitation may surprisingly be more relevant than the Court has perceived, see
Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231 (2013).
46 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (expressing concern that “[m]entally retarded defendants in
the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution”).
47 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009).
48 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
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held that the Eighth Amendment bars LWOP sentences for juveniles who committed non-
homicide offenses. In Miller, the Court barred mandatory JLWOP sentences.49 
One of the most logical extensions of the value of absolute proportionality would 
be to prohibit capital punishment for additional categories of defendants like those 
suffering from various types of brain injuries. Another extension of the proportionality 
principle would be to prohibit JLWOP sentences for particular classes of defendants or 
even prohibit these sentences altogether.50 Further, the Court could take the additional step 
of entirely dismantling the bright line between capital and non-capital cases, applying the 
Eighth Amendment’s capital case approach to additional kinds of non-capital sentences.  
Comparative Proportionality 
A corollary to the concept of absolute proportionality that has inhabited the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment cases is the concept of “relative” or “comparative” proportionality. 
While absolute proportionality assesses whether a particular kind of sentence is excessive 
under certain circumstances, comparative proportionality assesses whether a sentence is 
disproportionate in light of sentencing decisions in other cases. 
In Gregg v. Georgia,51 part of the state’s solution to the problem of sentencing 
disparities arising from jury sentencing decisions was its adoption of comparative 
proportionality review. Under this approach, the state supreme court reviewed jury verdicts 
in capital cases to assess whether a death sentence was consistent with prior jury decisions 
in capital cases. After the Court affirmed this approach in Gregg, a number of states have 
employed similar approaches in their capital sentencing procedures.  
The idea behind comparative proportionality is to eliminate outlier sentencing 
decisions by juries. While such an approach cannot guarantee complete consistency, it can, 
at the very least, minimize sentencing outcomes that fall outside of mainstream sentencing 
decisions. This is particularly important because states employ a wide variety of 
aggravating factors in capital sentencing, meaning that cases with widely differing levels 
of offender culpability within a jurisdiction can nonetheless be subject to capital sentencing 
determinations. Comparative proportionality review allows state supreme courts to strike 
down capital sentences that are excessive by comparison to previous cases in which the 
state imposed the death penalty. 
Although many jurisdictions have adopted this comparative proportionality 
approach, they have mostly conducted the analysis in a cursory, toothless manner. State 
supreme courts have reversed a negligible number of sentences based on comparative 
proportionality review. Most states limit this review to prior capital cases, meaning the 
court never considers the cases in which juries imposed a life sentence. In addition, the 
49 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
50 See William W. Berry III, Evolved Standards, Evolving Justices, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 
105 (2018). 
51 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
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proportionality review in most states consists simply of identifying other cases relying on 
the same aggravating factor and, based upon that factor alone, declaring the sentence 
proportionate.52 
Nonetheless, in Pulley v. Harris,53 the Supreme Court made clear that the Eighth 
Amendment does not require a comparative proportionality analysis at all. The Eighth 
Amendment simply requires meaningful appellate review of jury-imposed death sentences. 
While comparative proportionality review can be one way to satisfy the Eighth 
Amendment concern of arbitrary and capricious imposition of punishment, the 
Constitution does not mandate such an approach.  
While remaining a constitutionally approved but not required approach in the death 
penalty context, comparative proportionality review has also played a role in the 
assessment of non-capital sentences, but it is similarly ordinarily not constitutionally 
required. In Solem v. Helm, the Court used comparative proportionality concepts in 
assessing gross disproportionality, including the sentences imposed on other criminals in 
the same jurisdiction, and in other jurisdictions.54 While the contours of the Court’s gross 
disproportionality jurisprudence remain hazy, the Court made clear in Harmelin v. 
Michigan that such comparisons, while useful, were not constitutionally required in most 
cases.55 
Humanness 
In addition to focusing on proportionality in sentencing, the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment analysis has highlighted the importance of ensuring that punishments 
acknowledge the humanness of even the worst convicted criminal offenders.56 There are 
some punishments, such as torture, that are simply too horrendous to impose regardless of 
the offense committed. In Trop, for example, the Court found that the punishment of 
denationalization “subject[ed] the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized 
treatment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.”57 In fact, the Court found the punishment 
even “more primitive than torture.”58 In addressing the unconstitutionality of insufficient 
prison medical care under the Eighth Amendment, the Court was similarly concerned about 
52 See, e.g., William W. Berry III, Practicing Proportionality, 64 FLA. L. REV. 687 
(2012). 
53 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
54 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
55 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004–05 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Solem is best understood as holding that comparative analysis within and between 
jurisdictions is not always relevant to proportionality review. . . . [I]ntrajurisdictional and 
interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold 
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of 
gross disproportionality.”). 
56 See Ryan, supra note 13. 
57 Trop, 386 U.S. at 100. 
58 Id. 
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how such medical neglect could “actually produce physical ‘torture or a lingering death,’” 
which would amount to cruel and unusual punishment.59 And in striking down the practice 
of executing “insane” offenders, the Court emphasized the sheer inhumanity of the 
practice.60  
The Supreme Court’s command that punishments must reflect the humanness of 
individuals is important in this modern era of mass incarceration where thousands of 
individuals are convicted each year.61 To many prosecutors, judges, and citizens, these 
offenders must seem to be faceless numbers—the causes of victims’ pain and suffering and 
in part the source of staggering criminal justice expenses. But the Eighth Amendment 
requires that we remember the humanity of even the worst offenders. Although some 
prosecutors have been known to label these offenders as “animals,”62 we cannot treat them 
like that under the Constitution. Depending on how far one takes this principle, it could 
raise significant questions about a number of current punishment practices, such as LWOP, 
solitary confinement, certain techniques used to carry out execution, and even the death 
penalty itself. 
Non-arbitrariness 
The Court has also adopted an Eighth Amendment value of non-arbitrariness. In 
1972, the Court struck down the death penalty as applied throughout the United States in 
the landmark opinion of Furman v. Georgia. 63  The Justices were unable to reach a 
consensus about whether the death penalty was unconstitutional in its entirety or just as it 
was applied in this (and other) case(s), but there was significant agreement that, to the 
extent the punishment was unconstitutional, it was unconstitutional because of its 
unusualness. Some of the Justices noted the racially discriminatory way in which judges 
and juries had imposed the death penalty. But even more Justices focused on the arbitrary 
way in which capital punishment was imposed and carried out. For example, Justice White 
explained that, as applied, “the penalty [was] so infrequently imposed that the threat of 
execution [was] too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.”64 Justice 
Brennan pointed to the “steady decline in the infliction of the punishment in every decade 
since the 1930’s,” the increase in the number of capital crimes committed, and the resulting 
“rarity of the infliction of th[e] punishment.”65 He explained that, “[w]hen the punishment 
of death is inflicted in a trivial number of cases in which it is legally available, the 
59 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
60 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406–10 (1986). 
61 See, e.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Criminal Justice Facts, 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/ criminal-justice-facts/ (last visited, Oct. 1, 2019). 
62 See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986) (noting that the prosecutor 
referred to the defendant as an animal and stating that this “deserves the condemnation it 
has received from every court to review it, although no court has held that the argument 
rendered the trial unfair”). 
63 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
64 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
65 Id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of 
little more than a lottery system.”66 Justice Stewart characterized it as akin to “being struck 
by lightning.”67  
When the Supreme Court later upheld capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia68 in 
1976, it emphasized the importance of ensuring that states did not impose capital 
punishment arbitrarily or capriciously. The Court explained that capital punishment cannot 
“be imposed under sentencing procedures that create[] a substantial risk that [the penalty] 
w[ill] be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”69 Instead, a jurisdiction’s statutes 
must guide jury sentencing discretion, providing the jury with the tools to distinguish the 
offenders deserving of death from those who are not. The new Georgia scheme cured the 
Eighth Amendment arbitrariness concerns articulated in Furman in two important ways. 
First, the scheme mandated the use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
sentencing, requiring a factual finding for death eligibility and then requiring the jury to 
weigh such findings against mitigating evidence. Second, the state supreme court reviewed 
the determination of the jury in light of other cases, conducting a comparative 
proportionality review to promote consistency among jury decisions. Although not 
identical, jurisdictions across the country now provide capital sentencing juries with such 
guidance on their discretion, attempting to comply with the requirements of Furman under 
the Eighth Amendment.70 
It is worth noting that this value of non-arbitrariness is sometimes in tension with 
the value of individualized sentencing. Every case is unique, so when attempting to achieve 
some uniformity or consistency in sentencing across cases, it often comes at the expense 
of considering individual differences in each case. Justice Scalia made this argument in 
Walton v. Arizona, finding that individualized sentencing and non-arbitrariness are 
inconsistent because individualized discretion is the source of arbitrary outcomes.71 Justice 
Stevens disagreed, though, explaining that narrowing the class of death eligible offenders 
through requiring a finding of aggravating circumstances minimizes the concern of 
arbitrary outcomes, whereas individualized sentencing discretion is exercised within that 
narrowed group.72 Regardless of whether they are in tension, the Court’s cases have made 
clear that both individualized sentencing and non-arbitrariness are Eighth Amendment 
requirements. 
Applying a strong version of the non-arbitrariness value could result in, once again, 
66 Id. at 293. 
67 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
68 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
69 Id. at 188. 
70 Some have argued, though, that the guidance is, as a practical matter, insufficient to 
affect disparity concerns. Berry, supra note 52. 
71 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part), rev’d in 
part, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
72 Id. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Comparative proportionality review could, in 
theory, help to reconcile the apparent incompatibility of non-arbitrariness and 
individualized sentencing discretion. See Berry, supra note 52. 
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striking down capital punishment.73 The current use of the death penalty, with its consistent 
decline over the past decade, mirrors the conditions that the Court addressed in Furman. 
Today, only a few counties are responsible for most executions,74 resulting in a lack of 
uniformity in the punishment’s imposition. Further, only half of the states authorize the 
death penalty, and fewer than a quarter of them actively use it.75 The same is true for 
JLWOP sentences, with many states abandoning the punishment after Miller and fewer 
than half of them currently imposing JLWOP sentences.76 
Differentness 
Unlike the previous values that seem to bear some connection to dignity, the 
pervasive value of differentness appears to move further afield. The Supreme Court has, 
for the most part, treated capital cases differently than non-capital cases under the Eighth 
Amendment. While not the Court’s original approach, this distinction arose from the 
Court’s determination that “death is different.”77 This oft-repeated concept stems from the 
idea that death is a unique punishment, both in its severity and its irrevocability. There is 
no more serious punishment than the death penalty. And once a state carries out an 
execution, there is no way to reverse it. 
Using this principle, the Court has accorded capital cases heightened scrutiny under 
the Eighth Amendment. This value has served as the basis for categorical exclusions to the 
death penalty. It also has served as the basis for heightened procedural requirements in 
capital cases.  
More recently, the court has decided that juveniles are also different.78 This has 
meant, at the very least, that some of the categorical exclusions that apply to the death 
penalty also apply to juvenile offenders, at least in LWOP cases. It is possible that the 
procedural safeguards available in capital cases might also extend to JLWOP cases, but to 
date that has not happened. 
73 See Berry, supra note 52. 
74 See Frank R. Baumgartner, A Few Counties Are Responsible for the Vast Majority of 




75 See State by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 2019, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state. 
 76 See Berry, supra note 52. 
77 Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia is the source of the Court’s 
“death is different” capital jurisprudence. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober 
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital 
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 370 (1995) (crediting Justice Brennan as the 
originator of this line of argument); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is a unique punishment in the United States.”). 
78 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
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It is also unclear what the broadening of differentness might mean for future 
expansions of the Eighth Amendment. As death is a punishment but juveniles are a class 
of offenders, it suggests that expansion is possible, albeit not likely in the near future. If 
death is different, the Court could in theory also find that other punishments are different 
such that they might deserve heightened substantive or procedural safeguards. These might 
include LWOP sentences, life sentences, or sentences that extend beyond an offender’s life 
expectancy. If juveniles are different, other categories of offenders could, in theory, be 
different as well. One might imagine groups such as veterans, the elderly, or those with 
certain mental illnesses receiving the label of “different.”  
The consequence of the Court using the value of differentness has largely been 
positive for the “different” offenders and “different” offenses but has unfortunately had the 
consequence of preventing heightened scrutiny for “non-different” offenders and offenses. 
In other words, the Court has elected to limit Eighth Amendment scrutiny in non-capital 
cases in a comparatively restrictive manner.  
With respect to future applications of this principle, another approach would be 
simply to de-emphasize the value rather than create new categories of differentness. 
Continuing to create new categories of differentness could exacerbate the inconsistency 
and fragmented nature of existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather than creating 
a constitutional doctrine that mandates separation for death sentences in the form of higher 
scrutiny, it would also be possible to require a higher level of Eighth Amendment scrutiny 
for all cases. Although death may indeed be different, and children and LWOP sentences 
may also be different, courts may be able to accommodate these different characteristics 
within proportionality analyses and the more robust analyses typically applied in capital 
cases. 
The Future of Eighth Amendment Values 
The Eighth Amendment values discussed in this Chapter shed light on the 
constitutionality of a variety of criminal justice practices—from regularly litigated 
punishments like the death penalty to areas less considered like bail. These values help 
explain past Supreme Court decisions, but they also provide tools for Eighth Amendment 
litigants. Indeed, the question remains of how such values relate to the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment with respect to punishments that do not fit neatly into the Court’s currently 
defined categories. While not dispositive, these values can help explain why the Court’s 
doctrine should shift in particular circumstances over time. 
With respect to the death penalty, for instance, Eighth Amendment values have 
much to say. As use of the death penalty in the United States continues to decline, the 
strength of the argument that the punishment contravenes the evolving standards of 
decency grows.79 In addition, states increasingly impose the death penalty in an arbitrary 
79 See Berry, supra note 52. Such an outcome becomes magnified if one examines the use 
of the death penalty on a county level. See William W. Berry III, Unusual State Capital 
Punishments, 72 FLA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020). 
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way, as demonstrated by statistics on the impact of geography, race, and socio-economic 
status on capital decisions.80 Further, commentators have argued that the death penalty is a 
disproportionate punishment for all criminal offenses81 and that it violates human dignity. 
An overwhelming number of nations have also adopted this position.  In light of all of this 
evidence and the values illuminating Eighth Amendment meaning, there are real questions 
about the continuing constitutional viability of capital punishment, even though the Bill of 
Rights itself contemplates the punishment’s use. 
Juvenile LWOP sentences also create tension with a number of Eighth Amendment 
values. As the only country that imposes such sentences, the United States does not comply 
with evolving standards internationally. In addition, since the Miller decision in 2012, there 
has been a significant movement away from JLWOP even within the United States, with a 
number of states abolishing the punishment and many courts reducing sentences in light of 
Miller’s retroactive application.82  Currently, more than half of the states do not have 
anyone serving a JLWOP sentence, raising real questions about arbitrariness and 
proportionality when a court imposes such a sentence. 
The use of LWOP sentences in the United States similarly makes our nation an 
outlier internationally. There are more than 50,000 people serving LWOP sentences in the 
United States; the next three countries combined have fewer than 1,000 individuals serving 
such sentences. As with the punishments of death and JLWOP, adult LWOP sentences 
spark questions about offender dignity and proportionality—issues that have formed the 
basis for most other countries rejecting the practice. Further, many of the LWOP sentences 
imposed in the United States are the result of the abolition of parole, not a carefully 
considered decision that the offender deserves to die in prison. This creates significant 
concerns about respecting the values of individualized sentencing, non-arbitrariness, and 
humanness.  
Similarly, mandatory sentences undermine some of the core values of the Eighth 
Amendment. They deny individualized consideration, can threaten human dignity, and 
often result in disproportionate sentences. Almost every single value animating the Eighth 
Amendment counsels against allowing mandatory punishments. Considering that the Court 
has generally refused to strike down mandatory punishments across the board, its 
intervention in at least select mandatory sentencing cases would be a step in the right 
direction. 
Finally, these Eighth Amendment values can shed light on practices such as solitary 
confinement and even other Eighth Amendment areas like excessive bail and fines. 
Practices such as solitary confinement that leave lasting psychological damage on 
individuals clearly implicate questions about how to treat other human beings, even if they 
have committed terrible offenses. But if lasting psychological damage is a human dignity 
concern, then even relatively short stints in prison should receive serious Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny. Although Eighth Amendment application comes loaded with 
80 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
81 Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death 
Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2005). 
82 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).  
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relevant values like dignity, it does not necessarily provide us with clear answers about the 
permissiveness of any particular practice. Still, these values remain important and help 
shape our understanding of the Eighth Amendment. Although most references to these 
values are in Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause cases, they are also relevant to the 
important, but generally less litigated, Excessive Bail and Excessive Fines Clauses as well. 
To be sure, the current conservative tilt of the Supreme Court makes the expansion 
of Eighth Amendment protection less likely in the near future. Nonetheless, it is likely that 
these values will continue to inform the Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions irrespective 
of whether the doctrine expands or contracts. 
